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Legislation
THE UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT

Common disaster cases, involving multiple deaths at apparently the same
instant, present "some of the most vexing problems that lawyers and judges meet."'
These problems, moreover, are not mere academic exercises; the disposition of an
entire estate may depend upon the proof or, more often, the lack of proof as to
which of the victims in his dying moments held most tenaciously to life. And one can
reasonably suppose that with the resumption of transportation at its normal, breathtaking pace, such accidents will occur with increasing frequency.
In an attempt to establish an orderly scheme applicable to instances where
no proof of survivorship can be made, the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act was
formulated. As of September 10, 1947, this act is effective in Missouri. As the
commissioners who formulated it state, "The theory of the present act makes no
effort whatever to resolve the un-resoluble . . . (It is) that as to the property of
each person he is presumed to be the survivor and it is administered accordingly." 2
This statement may sound simple. If so, it is deceptive, since the uniform act
should effect significant changes in the Missouri law as it stood prior thereto. It
is our purpose here to examine briefly the application of the uniform act and certain
of the changes it seems reasonable to expect.
Each provision of the act specifies that it only applies where "there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously."3 To
determine when the rules of the uniform act are to govern, therefore, we must
ascertain where the court will draw the line as to the sufficiency of evidence of
survivorship. In this connection, it should be noted that Missouri, in accord with
most states, has refused to indulge in any presumption of survivorship, as contrasted
to the complex presumptions based on sex, age and other factors found in the civil
law.4 While the uniform act would render any such presumptions nugatory had
they existed, this fact is mentioned as perhaps shedding light upon some of the
decisions in regard to what is sufficient evidence of survivorship. The absence of
presumption may account for a con-current leniency in the requirements of proof.

1. Tracy and Adams, Evidence of Survivorship In Common Disaster Cases,
1 38 MICH. L. REv. 801 (1940).
2. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM1SSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFrIETH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 266 (1940).

3. Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 317.1, 317.2, 317.3, 317.4 (Supp. 1947).
4. U.S. Casualty Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, 69 S.W. 370 (1902). Although
cited in 1 FLA. L. REv. 75, at 77 (1948) as having been decided upon an implicit
presumption of simultaneous death, the language in Garbee v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 220 Mo. App. 1245, 290 S.W. 655 (1927), intimating that such a presumption may be used where there is no proof otherwise, does not appear to be more than
a concession for the sake of argument.
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Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship
Repository, 1948

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1948], Art. 7

1948]

LEGISLA TION

Four cases seem to show the Missouri law as to when simultaneous death has
been proved by the evidence, in which case this act would necessarily apply. When
a husband, his wife, and their son were occupying an automobile directly in the path
of a train traveling at the rate of 55 miles per hour, all of them being dead when
the train backed up to investigate following the accident, the court held there were
sufficient facts to support a finding that all three died at the same time. 5 In a
similar accident, a husband and wife were killed, both being dead when witnesses
reached them. Again the cohrt stated that the evidence was sufficient to find that
the husband did not survive the wife, "but that both died at the same time." 6 In
each of these cases, the evidence relied on by the court seemed to be the obvious
destructive force with which the train struck the auto, the extent to which the
car was demolished, the distance the bodies were thrown by the collision, and the
fact that all the parties were dead as soon as others reached them. Where a husband
and wife were both killed by gas fumes in the bathroom of their home, the body
of the husband being clothed and closer to the source of the gas and the body
of the wife nude and more distance from the stove, the court, while admitting that
plausible theories could e advanced to show survivorship by either victim, seemed
to uphold the trial court's finding that the parties died at the same moment 7 Where
the body of the husband was found on the floor beside the seat of the railroad coach
the body of the wife occupied, both having been killed in the same pre-dawn
collision, the court said that if there was a burden to show simultaneous death of
the parties, it was sustained by showing the time of day the collision took place,
the force and type of the collision, and the position'of the bodies.s Thus it seems
that the Missouri courts, while applying no presumption either of survivorship or
of simultaneous death, in the interests of justice have not been too demanding in
requiring proof that life departed from the two or three persons involved at precisely
the, same moment.
On the other hand, two Missouri cases show what is deemed sufficient proof
of survivorship, thus delineating situations where our uniform act would presumably not apply. Where the claims of the adverse parties depended upon whether
or not a child had survived its mother who died before its birth, proof that the
infant showed a faint heartbeat for a minute or two and uttered a cry or gasp, not
living more than one or two minutes at the most, was held sufficient to prove that
the child outlived the mother.9 Where the deceased husband and wife were employees on the same steamboat, the fact that the wife was seen in the stream approximately one and one-half minutes after the boat had capsized and turned completely
over, while the husband's body was not recgvered from under the boat until it was
righted, was held to be sufficient to show that the wife survived the husband.' 0
5. Garbee v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., supra note 4.
6. McCall v. Thompson, 348 Mo. 795, 155 S.W. 2d 161 (1941).
7. Abrams v. Unknown Heirs of Rice, 317 Mo. 216, 295 S.W. 83 (1927).
8. Aley v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 211 Mo. 460, 111 S.W. 102 (1908).
9. Taylor v. Cawood, 211 S.W. (Mo. 1919).
10 Warren v. Aetna Life Inc. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 202 Mo. App. 1, 213
S.W. 527 (1919).
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This, then, is the state of Missouri law on what is sufficient proof of survivorship and what is proof of simultaneous death. Since the rules under the uniform act
apply when no proof of survivorship is made, no positive finding of simultaneous
death would appear to be necessary. Therefore we might well question whether the
cases discussed s.tpra which seem to bd extreme in holding, on the bases of the
evidence before the court, that simultaneous death occurred will continue to represent the law. The uniform act in effect establishes a presumption of simultaneous
death in the situations it covers; and if we assume that the rules of the act are
substantially just, the court can find that simultaneous death occurred by applying
the statutory presumption, without torturing the facts.
The first section of the uniform act 1 lays down the general rule that in a
simultaneous death situation "the property of each person shall be disposed of as if
he had survived"' with the exceptions carved out by the further provisions of the
act which apply to specific relationihips between the deceased persons.
Section 2 of the act,12 dealing with beneficiaries "designed to take successively
by reason of survivorship under another person's disposition of property," may
perhaps need judicial decision to delineate the extent of its application. In a
simultaneous death situation involving such beneficiaries, the property is to be
divided into as many portions as there were beneficiaries, and the portions distributed respectively as if each beneficiary had survived.
Theapplication of this section can be shown' by two illustrations to which the
law would apparently pertain. (1) A by a will, deed, or trust agreement provides
that his land shall go to B and C for their joint lives, the remainder to go to
the survivor of them. 13 Prior to the uniform act, if B and C were killed under such
circumstances as to render i't impossible to prove which survived the other, it
would appear that claimants under neither could succeed to the property and it
would revert to the grantor, A. Now the uniform act applies, dividing the property
and giving one-half to the successors of each party. (2) A by a will, deed, or
trust agreement provides that his land shall go to his son B in fee, but if his son C
survives B, then the land shall go to C in fee. Here, assuming simultaneous death
of B and C, without the aid of tle statute it would appear that the land would
descend to the successors of B, since claimants under C would not be able to
establish the occurrence of the condition precedent to their taking. Under the
uniform act, however, the successors of each party would take one-half of the
property. While it may be said that this is in derogation of the words of the
grant, which require proof of C's surviving B before anything vests in C, it seems
clear that it is more in accord with the true desires of the grantor under these
unusual circumstances.

11.

Mo.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 317.1 (Supp. 1947).

12. Id. § 317.2.
13. Cf. Runions v. Runions, 207 S.W. 2d 1016 (Tenn. 1948), where this type
of estate apparently resulted from an attempt by a husband to create h tenancy
by the entirety in himself and his wife by a conveyance of an undivided one-half
interest to the wife.
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The third' section of the act provides that where there is no sufficient evidence
that two joint tenants or tenants by the entirety have died otherwise than simultaneously, "the property so held shall be distributed one-half as if one had survived
and one-half as if the other had survived." 14 If there are more than two joint
tenants and all of them have so died, the section provides for a proportional distribution.
Another instance where it appears that the uniform act has made a change in
the Missouri law is in the situation where the disposition of the proceeds of a
life insurance policy is in issue, the insured and the beneficiary having died under
circumstances preventing proof of the survival of either. The law as it existed
prior to the uniform act could decide adversely to the party bearing the burden
of proof; and whether the claimant under the insured or under the beneficiary had
ihe burden depended upon the interpretation given to the rights of the beneficiary
under the particular policy involved. Thus where an ordinary policy was payable
to the insured's daughter "if surviving; if not, to the legal representatives of the
insured," and no right to change the beneficiary was reserved to the insured, it
was held that the daughter had a vested interest in the proceeds and the claimant
under her must prevail over the insured's legal representatives, who could not
sustain the burden of proving that the daughter failed to survive her father.' 5 On
the other hand, in a case involving the same factual situation except that the
administrator of the daughter was seeking to recover on a certificate issued by a
fraternal benefit association under which the insured had the right to change
beneficiaries, the case was decided adversely to the administrator on the ground
that the daughter did not have a vested interest under such a policy and helce a
claimant through her must fail, being unable to sustain the burden of proving that
she survived her father. 6 Section 4 of the uniform act, 17 creating as it does an

irrebutable presumption in such a case that the insured survived, reaches a more
desirable, conclusion in that the disposition of the fund is not made to depend upon
the technical distinction of whether or not the beneficiary had a vested interest
under the policy. Moreover, it fulfills the presumably usual desire of the insured
to have the proceeds go to his successors rather than to those of the beneficiary
when the beneficiary dies at approximately the same time.
Section 6 of the act,' 8 in providing that the act shall not apply where an
applicable will, living trust, deed or contract of insurance provides for disposition
in a manner different from the scheme of the act, suggests what would seem to be
14. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 317.3 (Supp. 1947)_

15. U.S. Casualty Co. v. Kacer, supra note 4.
16. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Kicer, 96 Mo. App. 93, 69 S.W.
671 (1902). A keen concurring opinion by Bland, P.J., points up the logical
difficulties that present themselves in such- a situation in that a presumption of
simultaneous death of the parties is as faulty as a presumption that either survived
the other, and that, in the absence of some advantage given to one claimant by the
contract to insurance the situation would amount to an insoluble dilemma.
17. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 317.4 (Supp. 1947).

18. Id. § 317.6.
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the most desirable solution to such situations, notwithstanding the adoption of
the uniform act: that the instrument specifically provide for the desired disposition
in case a simultaneous death situation should occur.19 For maximum efficacy
this provision should extend beyond the strict situation to which the simultaneous
statute applies, governing the disposition in all cases .vhere the subsequent beneficiary dies, say, within thirty days of his predecessor. Tailored to fit the precise
situation, such a provision would most adequately fulfill the wishes of the grantor,
devisor or insured who normally prefer that his successor or beneficiary survive
him by an appreciable length of time before the property involved should pass.
Guy A. MAGRUDER, JR.

19. Matter of Fowles' Will, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918), illustrates
the use of such a provision.
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